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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By MORRIS B. ABRAM* AND ROBERT B. McKAY**
Georgia appellate courts did not in the year under discussion have the
occasion to pass on as many interesting and complex constitutional situations as in-the prior year. To a large extent the constitutional questions
in the period related to matters of criminal law and procedure, and it
was in this field, perhaps, more than any other that the principal decisions
lay.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

One notable exception is the case of J'Jcstern Union Telegraph Co. v.
State.' In that case the Supreme Court had to decide whether since enactment by Congress in

1943'

of an amendment to the Federal Communica-

tions Act of I934,' the Congress of the United States had pre-empted the
entire field and taken exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerned with
the discontinuance, reduction or impairment of service to any community
by telegraph companies. The case involved an interpretation and application of the commerce clause.' The case arose as a result of a penalty
suit filed by the State under Section 93-4 16 of the Code of Georgia against
the Western Union Telegraph Company because the company had, without the approval of the Georgia State Public Service Commission, but
with the approval of the Federal Communications Commission, changed
the character of telegraph service at Blakely, Georgia, from an independent office to a teleprinter-operated agency in a local drugstore.
The State, while conceding that Western Union operates as a single system for the handling of interstate and intrastate services and that separation of its facilities and employees on a basis of interstate and intrastate
services was impracticable, nevertheless contended that Georgia Public
Service Commission approval had to be first obtained before any change
in the character of such service could be instituted at the Blakely office,
even though it might affect that phase of the business indisputably under
federal control. This class of contentions placed before the Georgia
Supreme Court a fairly titanic question which had not been squarely decided
since the case of Colorado v. United States.'
The reasoning of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Coloradocase was precisely
adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in a decision by Judge Almand
*Member of the firm of Heyman & Abram, Atlanta; A.B., 1938, University of Georgia; J.D., 1940, University of Chicago; B.A., 1948, Oxford; Co-author, with Alex-

ander F. Miller, How to Stop Violence! Intimidation! in Your Community; Member
American and Georgia Bar Associations.
**Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University; B.S., 1940, University of Kansas;
LL.B., 1947, Yale University; Member of the Bars of Kansas, District of Columbia

and United States Supreme Court.

1. 207 Ga. 675, 63 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
2. 57 STAT. 11 (1943), 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1946).
3. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946).
4. U.S. CONST. Art I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. 271 U.S. 153, 46 S.Ct. 452, 70 L. Ed. 878 (1926).
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who stated the controlling question in the Western Union case to be: "Did
Congress, by the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934 (as
amended), . . . pre-empt the field as to the operation by Western Union

of a local agency or office handling both interstate and intrastate messages,
as shown by the facts in this case, so as to relieve the telegraph carrier
from compliance with Rule No. 2 of the Georgia Public Service Commission in a change of the character of service at its office and agency at
Blakely, Georgia ?"' The court unanimously found that since interstate and
intrastate services and facilities furnished by Western Union are "inextricably intertwined, under the authority of the Colorado case, the
federal authority must of necessity control both the interstate and intrastate service in the pre-empted field. Therefore, the court found that to
enforce the Public Service Commission ruling requiring authority before
a change in the character of the service furnished "would be in direct
conflict with the exerted power of the Congress of the United States under
the commerce clause." '
It is interesting to note that certiorari from the Supreme Court of the
United States was not requested in this case and the decision will probably stand as a precedent of nationwide application.
THE NEWSPAPER LIBEL VENUE BILL

Much interest was created in a series of bills introduced at the last
session of the General Assembly and aimed at the city newspapers, but
these failed to pass. One of the most critized bills was Senate Bill No.
149, which would have fixed the residence of corporations engaged in publishing newspapers in each county in which the publication "is regularly
delivered to one hundred subscribers," and would have placed the cause
of action for libel in each county where published. The writers feel that,
had this bill become law, it would have been violative of the provisions of
the State Constitution,' which establish venue for tort actions and prohibit
special legislation. Also, it probably would have necessitated change in
Section 22-1102 of the Code so as to make all corporate defendants, including newspapers, subject to suit everywhere an agent can be found.
THE ANTIMASK ACT

The Antimask Act, ° enacted by the General Assembly during its 1951
session, was in fact a comprehensive anti-Klan statute. Though not so
designated, the act, restricting the use of masks designed to conceal the
identity of the wearer and curbing cross burning and the use of symbols
for the purpose of intimidating, must certainly have been aimed at the
Ku Klux Klan.
The act, insofar as it forbids acts which are designed to intimidate or
which are trespasses on private property, is obviously merely a specific
restatement of age-old principles of the common law. What is novel in the
6. 207 Ga. at 678, 63 S.E.2d at 881.
7. 207 Ga. at 684, 63 S.E.2d at 884.

8. Ibid.
9.
10.

Art. VI, § 14, 1 6, GA. CODE § 2-4906 (1948 Rev.).
Ga. Laws 1951, p. 9.
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act is the legislative policy which finds certain conduct which was legal
under the common law (unless proved to have been engaged in for the
purpose of intimidating) to be per se illegal. Such action as wearing a
mask or exhibiting a flaming cross in a public place is found by the General
Assembly to be of a threatening nature and is accordingly prohibited. No
proof of evil motive is necessary in prosecutions of these violations. The
proscribed acts have become mala prohibita. The statute is realistic in
recognizing what has been public knowledge for thirty years: Klan activity
is intimidating to certain groups of the population, is intended and designed
to be and is engaged in for that purpose. The legislative power to correct
an evil of this nature under the state's police power is unquestioned. Indeed far more stringent anti-Klan legislation has United States Supreme
Court sanction."
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS

The correctness on precedent of the decisions in Pattersonv. Balkcom"
and Henderson v. State," which hold that constitutional rights were waived
at the trial level and could not be raised in the Supreme Court is not
questioned. However, a comparison of the issues in the two cases will serve
to illustrate the following private opinion of the authors. The doctrine
of waiver and estoppel as applied to constitutional rights of a defendant
in a criminal proceeding may have been carried too far. The state ought
not to be permitted to neglect its obligation to provide the defendant with
an impartial forum and adequate legal tools for his defense, except in
the instances of affirmative waiver by a defendant first advised of his
rights. This rule was applied in Gibbs v. Burke, 4 where the United States
Supreme Court seemed to say that the right to counsel is not waived by a
prisoner who is not notified of the right. The rule in Georgia on this point
is not clear," but there is no sound reason why the principle of the federal
rule on counsel should not be applied to the right to a properly composed
panel of jurors. In Patterson v. Balkcom"6 a writ of habeas corpus was
employed after conviction to raise the constitutional question under the
Fourteenth Amendment that members of the colored race were systematically excluded from jury service. The question had not been previously
raised on trial and the court properly (on the basis of precedents) held
7 it should
that the question could not then be raised. Since Crumb v. State,"
not be necessary for a Negro defendant to insist on a trial by a jury from
which members of his own race have not been systematically excluded, at
that delicate period when to do so may prejudice his case in the public eye.
The officials have a far better knowledge than the defendant of the procedures by which the juries are drawn. They know if they are complying with
the Crumb case; the defendant honestly may not know, and a few reversals
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

People v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 49 S.Ct. 61, 73 L. Ed. 184, 62 A.L.R. 785 (1928).
207 Ga. 511, 63 S.E.2d 325'(1951).
207 Ga. 206, 60 S.E.2d 345 (1950).
337 U.S. 773,69 S.Ct. 1247,93 L. Ed. 1686 (1949).
Compare Stokes v. State, 73 Ga. 816 (1884), with Elam v. Rowland, 194 Ga. 58, 20
S.E.2d 572 (1942).
16. 207 Ga. 511, 63 S.E.2d 325 (1951).
17. 205 Ga. 547, 54 S.E.2d 639 (1949).
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for failure to comply would soon end any strike against the spirit and
intent of that decision.
In Henderson v. State's the question presented was whether the defendant had waived his right to a public trial by agreeing through counsel that
the public could be excluded while a witness was examined on some delicate
matters. The court held that the right then being insisted upon had been
waived. This case is clearly one in which the defendant, informed of his
right, had affirmatively released it. As such it is wholly different from the
circumstance in the Patterson case where no disclosure was made to the
prisoner of the right or of the failure of the state to provide for its enforcement.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Loomis v. City of 4tlanta2 raised an issue which has much perplexed
the United States Supreme Court-the reconciling of the right of free
speech with the requirements of public order. Loomis was convicted under
a "disorderly conduct"ordinance of the City of Atlanta. The City Code"0
provided: "In general-it shall be unlawful for any person to act in a
violent, turbulent, quarrelsome, boisterous, indecent or disorderly manner,
or to use profane, vulgar or obscene language, or to do anything tending to
disturb the good order, morals, peace or dignity of the city." The court, in
view of the state of the record, was able to pass only on the question
whether the ordinance was void per se as contravening the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. No issue was presented
as to whether the ordinance was void as applied to the facts of the particular case. The court found the ordinance to be valid as challenged.
It would be interesting to see what the Georgia courts would decide
in a case which clearly presented the right of the police to arrest under "disorderly conduct" statutes persons whose sole offense was shrill and violent
language. This problem has caused great schisms in the United States
Supreme Court and the unhappy result is (as it appears to the writers)
entirely inconsistent opinions in cases2 1 separated by but two years. In
Terminiello v. Chicago the court reversed a disorderly conduct conviction
based on the defendant's derisive fighting words because ".. . a function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. 2 Yet in
Feiner v. New York a conviction of disorderly conduct was upheld though
in a "loud, high-pitched voice" and this
the offense consisted in speaking
"stirred up a little excitement.12 3 And when the police asked the defendant
to quit exercising a right which seemed assured under the Terminiello case,
he refused.
207 Ga. 206, 60 S.E.2d 345 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 346, 60 S.E.2d 397 (1950).
Section 66-201 (1942).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949) ; Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L. Ed. 253 (1951).
22. 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896, 93 L. Ed. 1131, 1134 (1949).
23. 340 U.S. 315, 317, 71 S.Ct. 303, 305, 95 L. Ed. 253, 259 (1950).
18.
19.
20.
21.
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DUE PROCESS

Due process was invoked several times during the past year in the
'
Georgia courts and in federal courts sitting in Georgia. Huff v. State2
required construction of identical provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures." Pointing
out that the United States Supreme Court has recently held that "in a
prosecution in a state court for a state crime the Fourteenth Amendment
does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure,"2 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the rule in
Georgia, as in a majority of states, permits the acceptance of such illegally
obtained evidence, although such evidence would have been inadmissible
in a prosectuion for a violation of a federal law in a court of the United
States under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." The holding, consistent
with previous Georgia cases to the same effect,2" is directly contrary to
the doctrine in the federal courts.2" The case illustrates in dramatic fashion
that even identical provisions in State and Federal Constitutions may be
differently construed and applied by the courts of those separate governments.
In Georgia Power Co. v. Brooks" again a claim was made of violation
of the due process clause under the Georgia Constitution. In that case
petitioner, as condemnor of an easement for an electrical transmission line
right-of-way, among other objections, challenged the constitutionality under
the Georgia Constitution of Section 36-608 of the Georgia Code.2 ' That
section, enacted in 1945 and not previously construed by the Georgia
Supreme Court, provided in substance that any real property condemnee
could have admitted in evidence the value of comparable real property and
could show the price paid by the condemnor for comparable preperty acquired within the previous two years. Citing as the general rule the proposition that in the absence of statute it is not incompetent in condemnation
cases to prove what the condemnor paid others for similar leases, Chief
Justice Duckworth stated that this general rule had been applied in Georgia
until the enactment of the new statute. The soundness of the rule, he
pointed out, was based on the consideration that in such transactions
either party may be subject to compulsion, particularly the condemnee,
who has no choice but to give up the claimed property. Thus was raised
the constitutional question in testing the validity of the statutory variance
from the principle previously adhered to. Chief Justice Duckworth, for
a unanimous court, held that, "since the section allows the condemnee to
prove such transactions, but does not allow the condemnor the same
24. 82 Ga. App. 545, 61 S.E.2d 787 (1950).
25. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; GA. CONST. Art. I,

Rev.).

§ 1, ff 3, GA.

CODE

§ 2-103 (1948

26. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1364, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 1788 (1949).
27. 82 Ga. App. at 548, 61 S.E.2d at 789.
28. Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. 271, 109 S.E. 662 (1921); Kennemer v. State, 154 Ga.
139, 113 S.E. 551 (1922) ; Polite v. State, 80 Ga. App. 835, 57 S.E.2d 631 (1950).
29. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
30. 207 Ga. 406, 62 S.E.2d 183 (1950).
31. Ga. Laws 1945, p. 143.
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right, it does not afford equal treatment, and, hence, is a denial of equal
protection to the condemnor ...and is void.""
While the surface validity of this proposition can scarcely be challenged,
one might wonder whether the condemnor, who is not under the same compulsion to buy as is the condemnee to sell, needs this kind of protection. For
the purpose of this section it might well be argued that the opposing
parties are not so similarly situated as to require equal treatment. The
court does not discuss this possibility.
8 the United States
In Screws v. United States"
Supreme Court, in a case
which arose in Baker County, Georgia, and described as involving "a
shocking and revolting episode in law enforcement," sustained a civil rights
statute" against an attack of vagueness by a clear requirement that punishment could be imposed "only for an act knowingly done with the purpose
of doing that which the statute prohibits..."3
The same statute has recently been construed again in a case arising
in Georgia. In Lynch v. United States" appellants, sheriff and deputy
sheriff of Dade County, Georgia, were found guilty of delivering Negro
prisoners in their charge to a hooded mob of Ku Klux.Klan followers "with
a willful intent that the prisoners would be beaten by the mob." 37 The
indictment in the Screws case, supra, was for affirmative acts (beating a
prisoner to death), whereas in this case the indictment was premised on a
failure to act. But this can make no difference. As the Court of Appeals
pointed out, ". . . the officer's dereliction of his duties, whether of omission
or commission, sprang from a willful intent to deprive his prisoner or
prisoners" 8 of constitutional rights. It can be hoped that Section 242 of
Title 18 will continue to be thus vigorously applied in such clearly appropriate cases.
EXTRADITION

The Federal Constitution"0 provides: "A person charged in any State
with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be
found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." The simplicity of this language, plus a
related federal statute since 179340 have not been effectual to obviate the
extradition problems that soon arose thereunder 4 ' and have continued to
the present day. The seriousness of the question is revealed by the fact
that at least one federal appellate judge might even "turn loose a convicted murderer" rather than relinquish "an individual who not only
has suffered cruel and unusual punishment but also faces grave and im32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

207 Ga. at 410. 62 S.E.2d at 186.
325 U.S. 91.65 S.Ct. 1091, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945).
35 STAT. 1092 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1946) (now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1951)).
325 U.S. at 102. 65 S.Ct. at 1036, 89 L. Ed. at 1503.
189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951), petition for writ of certiorari filed July 18, 1951.
189 F.2d at 480.
Ibid.
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
The earliest provision is found in 1 STAT. 302. It now appears at 18 U.S.C. § 3182
(Supp. 1951). Georgia adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in 1951, Ga.

Laws 1951, p. 726.
41. See MOORE, EXTRADITION c. 2, § 2 (1891).
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minent danger of like abuse and very possibly even death by extra-legal
means, if he is retured to Georgia."'"
The question of the extent to which a federal court may review the
regularity of prospective state court proceedings in another state was
raised, but not resolved in Dye v. Johnson.43 Its holding,4" that a fugitive
must exhaust his state court remedies before filing his case in a federal
district court, did not indicate whether the remedies to be exhausted were
intended to be those of the demanding state or of the asylum state. It
thus created more difficulties than it solved. Georgia, which has had
more than its share of extradition problems, has vigorously argued that
the state remedies required to be exhausted before resort to federal
courts are those of the demanding state. In each of two cases, decided
during the survey period by federal circuit courts in which the issue has
been considered since the decision in Dye v. Johnson, supra, habeas corpus
was denied and the Georgia contention has been upheld.4" Perhaps within
the next year one of these cases will make its way to the United States
Supreme Court for final determination of the issue.
FULL FAITH AND

CREDIT

Sufficiency of domicile to sustain a Nevada divorce against collateral
attack was discussed with singular clarity in Patterson v. Patterson." The
bona fides of the husband's removal to Nevada and alleged change of
domicile thereto were sharply contested by the wife, who sought temporary
and permanent alimony. The trial court refused to admit in evidence a
duly exemolified cony of the Nevada oroceedings granting the husband a
divorce, and denied the husb-and an opportunity to Dresent Iii evidence of
the purported change of domicile in the presence of the jury. Stating "that
this is a legal ouestion for the court and not a question of fact for the
jury," the trial court accordinly held the claimed divorce to be "null
and void, and contrary to public

DolicV.'

7

In reversing, justice Almand

pointed out that the record of the proceedings and decree
in the Nevada court showed on its face a valid divorce which was
entitled to Drima facie validity in the Georgia courts under the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. and that the evidence should
ha\ve been admitted and the burden thereafter placed upon the plaintiff
42. :Relon.
C.J., dissentinfr in Johnson v. Matthows, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
43. 338 U.S. 864.70 S.Ct. 146.94 L. Ed. 530 (19-40).
44. Jn q one sentence per curiam decision the United States Supreme Court reversed
the United States Court of Annesls for the Third Circ',it on the sole authority of
Ex part- Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944), which was not an
extradition ease.
45. Davis v. O'Connel. 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950). relbearinz denied 1951; Ross v.
Middlpboolcs. 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951). Accord. Johnson v. Matthews. 182 F.2d
677 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Dye v. Johnson. note 43. svra, on remand to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania at this writing is
aoain bein- tried on the issues outlined above.
46. 208 Ga. 7. 64 S.E.2d 441 (1951). See. for examnIes of the confusion attendant unon
this problem. Williams v. North Carolina. 317 U.S. 287. 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279,
143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942) ; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092,
89 L. Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366 (1945): Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 65
S.Ct. 118, 89 L. Ed. 1608. 157 A.L.R. 1396 (1945) ; Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 69
S.Ct. 751, 93 L. Ed. 957 (1949).
47. 208 Ga. at 8, 64 S.E.2d at 443.
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to show that it was not bindng upon her." The correctness of this decision
seems clear.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN CRIMINAL CASES

The administration of criminal justice was challenged on constitutional
grounds in a number of cases within the past year. Among the more interesting were the following:
In McBurnett v. Balkcom4" petitioner was under sentence of death. On
June 8, I95O, after appeals prevented carrying out the execution on the
date originally set, a new date of July 28, I95O, was fixed. On July 25,
i95O, he sought release by a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that at the
time of this sentencing he was not present and had not waived his right
to be present. On those facts he claimed violation of the Federal and
State Constitutions." Petitioner further argued that the restraint was
illegal because the order fixing the date of execution was not set in accordance with the requirement of the Georgia Code that the time set shall
be "not less than ten days nor more than 2o days from the date of such
order."'" On the authority of Fowler v. Grimes, 2 the Supreme Court
denied an invasion of any constitutional rights, apparently on the theory
that this was a re-sentencing which merely extended the date of execution.
Moreover, even if the order fixing the date for execution was void for
failure to comply with the statutory method, still no grounds for discharge from the original sentence were given so that respondent's only
duty would be to surrender petitioner for the fixing of a new date for
carrying out the original sentence. 3
In 1903 the Georgia Legislature expressly divested the Georgia courts
of all jurisdiction to determine the mental status of one alleged to have
become insane after the date of conviction of a capital offense. 4 The
55
validity of that provision was squarely challenged in Solesbee v. Balkcom,
and upheld. The same question, involving the same petitioner, previously
was decided"5 and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 7 in
which Mr. Justice Black said:
We are unable to say that it offends due process for a state to deem its
Governor an 'apt and special tribunal' to pass upon a question so closely related
to powers that from the beginning have been entrusted to governors. And here
the Governor had the aid of physicians specially trained in appraising the elusive
and often deceptive symptoms of insanity. It is true that governors and physicians might make errors of judgment. But the search for truth in this field is
that may beget error. Even judicial determination of
always beset by difficulties
58
sanity might be wrong.

48. Esenwein v. Esenwein and Rice v. Rice, both supra, note 46.
49. 207 Ga. 452, 62 S.E.2d 180 (1950).
50. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; GA. CONST. Art. I, § 1, 1 2 to 5, GA. CODE §§ 2-102 to
2-105 (1948 Rev.).
51. GA. CODE § 27-2518 (1933).
52. 198 Ga. 84, 31 S.E.2d 175 (1944).
53. Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106. 135 S.E. 481 (1926) ; Smith v. Henderson, 190
Ga. 886, 10 S.E.2d 921 (1940) ; McLendon v. Balkeom, 207 Ga. 100, 60 S.E.2d 753
(1950).
54. GA. CODE § 27-2601 (1933).
55. 208 Ga. 121, 65 S.E.2d 263 (1951).
56. Solesbee v. Balkeom, 205 Ga. 122, 52 S.E.2d 433 (1949).
57. 339 U.S. 9, 70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L. Ed. 604 (1950).
58. Id. at 12, 70 S.Ct. at 459, 94 L. Ed. at 607. See also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398,
18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515 (1897).
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The difference between the rights of the accused in a case such as this
and during trial is the "necessary and inherent" difference between trial
procedures and post-conviction procedures such as sentencing.
In Key v. State" petitioner was charged with illegal possession of liquor
by indictment returned on January 17, 195o. By an accusation of July 2,
1948, charging the commission of a similar offense on June 12, 194 8,
petitioner had entered a plea of nolo contendere. His defense of double
jeopardy in the instant case was upheld; the Supreme Court reversing the
trial court. In a trial for a misdemeanor in Georgia the State may prove
that the act was committed any time within two years preceding the finding of the indictment or the filing of the accusation." Accordingly, since
by statute in Georgia a plea of nolo contendere constitutes jeopardy of the
defendant within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution,' it follows that
the judgment was right.
Conviction of defendant for possession of liquor for sale, and for sale2
of liquor after revocation of his license was reversed in Cruintev v.State.
The county governing authority, without hearing, revoked defendant's
license to sell liquor for failure to comply with a condition of the original
license that petitioner pay to the county five per cent of the gross receipts of
his liquor sales. In Georgia the sale of liquor is a privilege and not a right.
Thus, in the valid exercise of the inherent police power, city or county
governments may revoke liquor licenses without hearing or notice, 3 but it
is not a valid exercise of the police power to make, as a basis of the revocation, failure to pay a license imposed in any manner except as provided by
law, namely, a flat sum payable annually in advance."
In ,Walker v. Whittle," an action against sheriffs of two counties and
their sureties for the willful and wrongful invasion of plaintiff's privacy
by an unlawful entry into her home to arrest her husband, whereby she
suffered damages resulting from shock and fright, the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds. However, the court, by way of dictum,
passed on the merits of the cause of action alleged, as follows :6
The unlawful entry into the plaintiff's home for the purpose of committing a
misdemeanor therein, if the plaintiff was present and suffered from shock and
fright as a result thereof, is such a violation of her right of privacy within the
confines of her. home as to give her a rieht
of action. . . .The right arises under
7
the State Constitution and State Laws.
Reid v. Perkerson5 involved an application

for the writ of habeas corpus
to secure a prisoner's release. There were three issues: (i) a contention
that a $;oo bail bond for the Recorder's Court of Valdosta was excessive (held not excessive) ; (2) that a lottery ordinance of the City
59.

83 Ga. App. 839, 65 S.E.2d 278 (1951).

60. Webb v. State, 13 Ga. App. 733, 80 S.E. 14 (1913) ; Cole v. State, 120 Ga. 485, 48
61.
62.

S.E. 156 (1904).
Art. 1, § 1, % 8, GA. CODE § 2-108 (1948 Rev.) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1410 (Supp.
1947).
83 Ga. App. 459, 64 S.E.2d 380 (1951).

63. Owens v. Rutherford. 200 Ga. 143, 36 S.E.2d 309 (1945).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See 83 Ga. App. at 463. 64 S.E.2d at 383.
83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951).
83 Ga. App. at 450, 64 S.E.2d at 91.
GA. CONST. Art. I, § 1,
16, GA. CODE § 2-116 (1948 Rev.);
(1933).
207 Ga. 27. 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950).

GA. CODE § 26-1502
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of Valdosta went further than the general law (held not unconstitutional
inasmuch as the ordinance adds to and supplements the general law) ; (3)
that the act making the possession of a lottery ticket prima facie evidence
of violation of the law was unconstitutional as contravening the Federal
and State Constitutions"0 (held not unconstitutional).
The-decision of the court seems sound on grounds-one and two, but the
decision so far as ground three is conserned is less supportable. The dissent
by Chief Justice Duckworth and Justices Atkinson and Head is not supported by a written opinion to indicate specific issues wherein they disagree
with the majority. Abesence of a minority opinion is unfortunate, particularly in those cases in which the ruling relates not to one principle of
law but to several. The majority based its decision upholding ground three
above on the idea that lottery numbers are articles of unusual character
and that they are unlikely to be found in the hands of innocent parties.
Would a similarly drafted law making the possession of poker chips a
prima facie evidence of a violation of the law be equally defensible? The
injustice of any such law is easily apparent.
In Barton v. State" there was a sodomy conviction and a life sentence
imposed. Subsequently the General Assembly reduced the penalty applicable to such crimes. Appellant contended that the ex post facto clause
of the State and Federal Constitutions protected him against the imposition
of the sentence accorded by the law existing at the time of his conviction.
The court rightly held that the ex post facto provisions apply only to laws
which aggravate the crime and increase the punishment or allow conviction
on a less or different weight of evidence and not to those which reduce the
penalty. In any event, it would not be ex post facto treatment to apply the
punishment applicable at the time of one's conviction. This was a case for
executive action and not for judicial relief.
In Clarke v. State" the defendant, convicted of violating Code Section'
45-512, prohibiting the use of power driven nets for fishing in protected
waters, asserted that the statute violated the due process clause of the
State and Federal Constitutions. The court held otherwise on the authority
of the recently decided Willians v. State."
MISCELLANEOUS
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Cole v.
held constitutional the Peace Officers Annuity and
Benefit Fund Act" there construed for the first time. It provides, among
other things, for payment to the Treasurer of the Board of Commissioners
of the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund the sum of $i.oo in each
case wherein a fine of $ .oo or more is collected for violation of a state
statute or municipal ordinance,75 and for disbursement of annuities and
benefits to peace officers eligible to participate thereunder. Affirming a
69.
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mandamus absolute granted by the court below to compel a clerk of a
recorder's court to pay over to the treasurer sums claimed under the act,
the Supreme Court held that the act does not: (i) confer upon the
board power to conduct an insurance business, (2) impose an unauthorized
tax, (3) appropriate money of a municipality for other than purely
charitable purposes,"3 (4) impose an occupation tax upon the clerk collecting the fines, (5) provide donations and gratuities to peace officers to
whom benefits are paid, 77 all of which were urged as rendering the act unconstitutional. To the argument that the act would encourage prosecutions
solely to build up the fund, the court answered that public officers are
presumed to do their duty.
Since 1924 Georgia has had a firemen's pension fund law"8 under which
each fireman was assessed a percentage of his pay, and in return was
entitled to specified benefits. In 1935 the pension acts were amended" to
reduce the payments available upon retirement. Petitioner in Bender v.
Anglin became a member of the fire department in 1915 and paid the
assessments until his retirement in 1942, whereupon he was paid at the
reduced rate until 1949 when he applied for adjustment of his pension,
to be retroactively applied. Upon denial of his application he brought this
action for mandamus against the Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund of Atlanta, contending that the Act of 1935 as applied to him
was an impairment of the obligation of the contract between him and the
City of Atlanta."1 This contention was upheld by the Supreme Court in its
reversal of the court below.
Schneider v. Folkston12 illustrates the rigidity with which the Georgia
courts apply the provisions of the Georgia Constitution requiring no more
than one subject matter to be contained in a bill and forbidding the inclusion of subject matter not expressed in the bill's title. 3 In that case the
Town of Homeland brought this suit to enjoin the City of Folkston from
exercising mnuicipal control over land allegedto be a part of Homeland.
Respondent city claimed such right of control by virtue of a 195o act of
the General Assembly," entitled "An Act to amend the Charter of the
City of Folkston in the County of Charlton and State of Georgia; . . .
and for other purposes." The act was held invalid both for seeking to
amend the charters of two municipal corporations in the same bill, and
for attempting to modify the charter of Homeland without its appropriate mention in the title. As to the first objection, however, it is difficult to
understand why the expansion of Folkston at the expense of Homeland
is more than a single subject. Is it possible to enlarge Folkston by inclusion
76. GA. CONST. Art. VII, . 5,1 1, GA. CODE § 2-5801 (1948 Rev.).
77. GA. CONST. Art VII, § 1,1 2. GA. CODE § 2-5402 (1948 Rev.). The claim of violation
was that the act, in determining the amount of benefits due by reason of service,
does not fix the beginning date of the service at the date of the act, but from the
time of entering on the duties.
78. Ga. Laws 1924, p. 167; see GA. CODE n. preceding c. 69-1 (Supp. 1947).
79. Ga. Laws 1935. p. 450: see GA. CODE n. preceding c. 69-1 (SupD. 1947).
80. 207 Ga. 108, 60 S.E.2d 756, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811, 71 S.Ct. 125, 95 L. Ed. 49
(1950).
'81. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 10, c. 1; GA. CONST. Art. I, § 3,
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84. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 2373.
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of area now within the geographical confines of Homeland without, by
that very act, decreasing the area of Homeland? We think not. And if the
first objection falls, it would seem that there should fall with it the second,
since under that construction there would be but a single subject in the
bill, and thus the identification sufficient. In any event, the problem raised
in this particular case has since been resolved by the 1951 session of the
General Assembly which enacted two separate bills to accomplish the result
forbidden in the instant case.83
Teiford v.Gaincsvfl/c" involved a challenge to the constitutionality of
the Housing Authorities Law of 1937, as amended."7 By that act there
was created in each county and in a defined class of cities a housing
authority which, under the Housing Cooperation Law,"8 was designed to
alleviate housing problems throughout the state and had broad authority
to take the necessary steps toward that end. To the argument that this involved an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the governing body
of a municipality without provision for notice and hearing the court held
that it is "well understood that, while a legislature may not delegate the
power to make laws, it may nevertheless delegate the power 'to determine
some fact or state of things on which the law may depend'. "88 In view
of the fact-finding rather than judical nature of the authority's proceedings, notice and hearing upon the question of the necessity for activating
the authority is not required by due process. A further argument that the
act was unconstitutional in that it might have the effect of lessening competition or encouraging monopoly was dismissed by the court as unsupported in law or reason.
By vay of supplement to this case it is interesting to note that the
Redevelopment Law of 1946, as amended in I95i," providing for an additional delegation to the housing authorities, has yet to be construed
by the appellate courts of the state. The purpose of that act is "...
to
authorize housing authorities to clear slums and blighted areas . . ." By
Section 3 of the act, as amended, the housing authorities may undertake
redevelopment projects. For the accomplishment of this purpose they are
empowered to acquire land in areas of the designated kinds, to clear the
land, reconstruct streets and utilities, and thereafter to make such area
available to private enterprise in fulfillment of the ."redevelopment" purposes of the act. Recently a similar legislative program for slum clearance
in Alabama was upheld in an advisory opinion rendered by the Alabama
Supreme Court in response to a request from the Governer of that state:"
In that opinion the court, citing cases from a number of other jurisdictions,
held that such legislation was not a taking of private property for a
private use without the consent of the owner. It would seem that the
Georgia courts, when called utjon to construe the Georgia Redevelopment
Law, should have little difficulty in arriving at a similar result.
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